Tremendous growth in recent times of financial institutions has prompted financial analysts to study their behaviour closely. In this study, an attempt is made to explain the behaviour of financial intermediaries in terms of the portfolio theory using a preference function approach. The model developed here is largely theoretical in nature, and deals only with pure intermediation rather than the diversified activities of today's intermediaries.
Financial intermediation presupposes the absence of complete financial self-sufficiency, the existence of some economic units whose receipts exceed their expenditure, and of other units whose expenditure is in excess of their receipts. Financial intermediaries transmit excess funds efficiently and promptly from surplus units to deficit units. They do so by issuing claims on themselves (by accepting deposits, etc.) to surplus units and by the purchase of primary securities from deficit units.
Financial Intermediation: A Portfolio Problem
In pure forms of intermediation a financial intermediary offers one rate for its deposits and lends these funds at another rate. It is the maintenance of this rate discrepancy which makes intermediation possible. In an economically rational world, such a rate differential is feasible only if it is smaller than the full costs that the intermediary's debtor would incur in seeking funds directly. The financial intermediary offers portfolio advantages of diversifying such credit Vikalpa, Vol. 3, No. 2, April 1978 risks across a large number of borrowers and helps in smoothening the differences in assetliability maturity. The liability side of the financial intermediary's balance sheet is also a portfolio problem since the predictability of deposit turnover is increased by broad diversification across depositors. So long as deposit inflows and outflows are uncertain and so long as costs of excessive and insufficient reserves are asymmetrical, intermediaries will have good reasons to diversify their portfolios. Thus, at the core of the opportunity for intermediation is the portfolio problem-the achievement of appropriate mix of assets and liabilities, not only separately but together as well.
The attractiveness of any business activity depends on return and variability. In creating a portfolio one wants not simply to create a given level of return, but, given some level of return, to minimize the risk associated with it. To minimize the risk, nonfinancial corporations diversify their investments among different productive assets but, in the case of financial intermediaries, yields on many assets tend to be highly correlated with a common capital market, and tend to reduce the advantages of diversification among assets. The financial intermediary can reduce the default risk on loans by diversifying among different borrowers; still, the value of the assets portfolio is quite unprotected against ups and downs of interest rates.
However, the consideration of both assets and liabilities, whose returns typically have high positive correlation in a common capital market, can change the picture for the better. By owning one asset and owing another, the increased cost of a liability is offset by the increased return on an asset and vice versa. The significance of this fact lies not on its impact on the profitability of intermediation but on tha riskiness of return.
Earlier Studies
By and large, literature on the theory of financial intermediation has concentrated on either the asset or the liability side of the balance sheet. Very few efforts have been made to consider the explicit dependence between securities bought and sold to explain the portfolio behaviour of financial intermediaries. The first and perhaps the only attempt in this direction was made by Pyle (1971) . He has presented a theoretical model of financial intermediaries in terms of risk aversion. His model takes deposit and loan rates as random variables and suggests a method for determining optimum levels of deposits and loans in terms of means and variances of deposit and loan rates. A major limitation of this model is that it assumes away the phenomenon of fluctuations in deposit variability. Clearly not all deposits are grown from within in the real world. Financial intermediaries usually accept deposits from customers and lend these to others. A representative financial intermediary (in its pure form) sets the deposit rate (by custom or by legal requirements) and faces an uncertain volume of deposits which it may receive. In a world of uncertainty, the intermediary must estimate the amount of deposits which it can attract within the deposit rate it offers.
Framework
More than anything else, uncertainty in its various guises makes the intermediary's job a difficult one. Its task is to choose optimum values of the deposit rate and the loan volume to maximize its utility which is a function of return and variance over the planning period. Uncertainty arises because the intermediary does not know exactly how large its deposit liabilities will be at any moment of the future, and the loan rate which it would receive for the optimum level of loans.
The firm (the financial intermediary) begins the period with some net worth (K). It fixes a deposit rate (presumably at its optimum level) to which depositors respond during the period.
With a given deposit rate, there is an anticipated level of deposits. This level of deposits is based on the interest elasticity of deposits. The actual amount of deposits varies, depending en many factors including the size of the firm, its deposit growth, average deposit size, and the number of depositors.
The securities which the firm has are deposits, loans, and riskless securities. Since the problem of diversification within each of these portfolios (that is, what types of loans or deposits are held) will not be of concern in this analysis, each of these categories will be assumed internally homogeneous (for example, no distinctions are made between time and demand deposits) to keep the model simple.
The planning period is that span of time upon which the firm concentrates all its attention and over which it sets, and does not plan to alter, its asset portfolio. The firm knows or estimates with complete confidence all the parameters of its environment that are relevant to its portfolio choice for the ensuing period. The portfolio of the current period is not affected by the expectations of change in parameters in the next period. In short, the assumpticns about the period are those required to keep the model manageable and static.
The symbols used in this study are given below: X d ). This covariance arises from the fact that the potential creditor has the opportunity to buy the asset (to make a loan) himself without the interposition of the intermediary. So, if the rate differential between t' L and i d increases, it is likely that investors would find it profitable to lend funds directly to the debtor and hence the total amount of deposits with the firm would go down. In short, the loan rate and the volume of deposits are inversely related. K is the initial capital or net worth X 0 =the amount invested in a riskless security /" riskless interest rate, and 9 risk-aversion index which can take values between 0 and oo.
Decision Variables
X /i =Amount
Structure of the Model
The firm's objective function is to maximize its utility in terms of the expected additions to its net worth, i.e., the expected profit (w) and its variability (a 2 ). Thus, our task is to maximize F(u,a 2 ) with respect to the amount of loans (X L ) and the deposit rate (i d ). Since, the firm likes increased profits but dislikes increased variability, we need to have SF/Su positive and SF/Sa 2 negative. If we define 0=
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we can be sure of having the risk-aversion factor (9) to be positive. The balance sheet constraint is given by
Expected profit is measured by
Replacing the value of X 0 obtained from equation (1), we get (5) and
(6) For a firm to engage in intermediation, loans (X L ) and deposits (X d ) must take positive values. This implies that the right hand side of equation (6) must be positive.
For easy analysis, the right hand side of equation (6) can be split into three parts: risk aversion factor 9, the denominator, and the numerator. Risk aversion factor is positive by definition. The denominator is also positive because S XX S LL -S^2 ^ 0 since correlation coefficient (p 2 ) is always less than or equal to one. The remaining term -^-QS LL in the denominator is also positive, since expected deposits are assumed to increase with deposit rates. Now, the numerator
•«r* will be positive only if is the covariance of loan rate (/ £ ) and the amount of deposits (X d ). Such covariance would be negative because as the loan rate increases, with the deposit rate fixed, deposits would go down (disintermediation). In interpreting the above results, we can make the following observations. For a fixed deposit rate (by choice or where rates are fixed by the central bank), the risk premium in the expected loan rate (£(//_)-i 0 ) is proportional to the slope-coefficient for deposits in relation to the loan fate which means that the more sensitive are deposits to the loan rate, the smaller is the risk premium. As the premium charged on the loan rate increases, the surplus units (depositors) will have incentive to lend funds directly without going through intermediaries. It can also be inferred from the results that if capital markets are very competitive, the difference between deposit rate and lending rate would be minimum compared to restricted and undeveloped capital markets.
Other factors influencing the size of risk premium in loan rate would be the variability of deposits (S xx ), the firm's attitude towards risktaking (9), the interest sensitivity of deposits, and the size of the firm. A higher variability of deposits involves larger risk and the firm would require additional premium. A higher value of 9 would result in a larger premium. Bigger firms (for whom Xd is large) would operate on a smaller In a perfect capital market the loan rate is determined by the market demand and supply of funds and does not get significantly affected by the amount of loan offered by any one intermediary; that is, loans can be assumed to be in perfectly elastic supply to the intermediary. A question can be asked: given the loan rate (and thereby market determined risk premium), under what conditions will the desired level of loan be positive? Equation (6) shows that if 5^=0 the risk premium must be positive if X L is to be greater than zero. If, however, S^ is negative, X L could be greater than zero even if the risk premium is negative. However, this conclusion is a bit strained. If E(i L )<r' 0 , depositors would never purchase loans directly as they would be dominated by the riskless asset. Thus, £(i' L ) > /o would appear to be necessary for positive loan position.
The other question examined in this study is whether a firm can pay positive premium on deposits over the risk-free rate of return and still engage in intermediation. For this, we analyse equation (5). In this equation, we have a positive 6 and a positive denominator; therefore, the numerator and the left-hand side of the equation would be of identical sign. A positive sign would mean a positive premium in deposit rate over the risk-free rate. A negative sign would mean that the rate paid on deposits is lower than the risk-free rate and this is possible only if
For intermediation to be possible, deposits (X d ) must take a positive value. With a negative premium on deposits, Xa takes a positive value if the inequality is sufficiently large. This also substantiates Pyle's (1971, p. 745) observation that "if the yields on loans and (yields on) deposits are independent, the necessary and sufficient conditions for intermediation are a positive risk premium on loans and a negative risk premium on deposits." However, Pyle also concludes that in certain conditions a firm may engage in intermediation even if it pays a positive premium on deposits. The conditions under which this would be possible is when the yield on deposits is positively related to the yield on loans. In our model, a positive premium on deposits is feasible only if S Lx takes a positive value. S Lx is positive if an increase in the loan rate has a positive influence on deposits. This is possible in Pyle's model where the deposit rate is variable and positively related to the loan yield. An increased loan rate would mean an increased deposit rate which in turn would result in a higher level of deposits. In our model, the deposit rate in the planning period does not change. It is optimally or legally fixed at the beginning of the planning period, and the size of deposits becomes stochastic in nature, influenced by changing market conditions including loan yields. With an increase in loan yields, a depositor would have incentive to invest funds directly. This would result in a decreased level of deposits suggesting a negative value for S Lx .
Conclusion
To conclude, it can be stated that the portfolio theory approach provides interesting insights into intermediaries' working. By and large, literature on the theory of financial intermediation has concentrated on either the asset side or the liability side of the balance sheet. In this article, we have explicitly considered the fact that the two sides of an intermediary's balance sheet are not independent. If the interest rate it charges for loans gets out of alignment with the deposit rate it offers, the process of disintermediation begins.
Clearly, there are limitations of a static model like the one presented here. A dynamic model would greatly aid in understanding the working of different policy variables at macro level.
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Finally, the analysis suggests that much empirical testing should be done to gauge the actual interdependencies between assets and liabilities of financial intermediaries.
